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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
which acquires other property subject to the restrictions, and then
violates these restrictions. It leaves open the question as it relates
to a public service corporation with the right of eminent domain.
The reasoning of the court, seemingly based on public policy con-
siderations, is not convincing. But since the court had not pre-
viously determined definitely whether a property interest was
created by restrictive covenants, it can not be said that the decision
is erroneous.
R.M.
STATUTES-INTmE,-PAToN-TEEm "STorN" AS USED IN THE
NATIONAL MOTOR VmcLE Tm~r Acr.-The appellee was informed
for violation of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, making it
a criminal offense for one to transport in interstate' or foreign com-
merce a motor vehicle, knowing it to have been "stolen". 41 STAT.
324 (1919), 18 U.S.C. § 2812 (1946). The information charged the
appellee with unlawful interstate transportation of an automobile,
lawfully acquired in South Carolina, but converted (embezzled)
before transportation. Does the term "stolen" as used in this federal
act include not only common law larceny, but also embezzlement?
Held, the word "stolen," as used in the National Motor Vehicle
Theft Act, is not limited to a taking which amounts to common law
larceny, but includes embezzlement and other felonious takings with
the intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of owner-
ship. Reversed and remanded. (6-8 decision). United States v.
Turley, 77 Sup. Ct. 897 (1957).
At the outset the Court was confronted with a distinct conflict
of authority among the federal circuits on this question. The Fifth,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits favored the narrow construction which
limited the term "stolen" to mean only common law larceny.
Murphy v. United States, 206 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1953); Ackerson
v. United States, 185 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1950); Hite v. United
States, 168 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1948). But the Fourth, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits favored the broad construction which includes em-
bezzlement and other felonious takings. Boone v. United States,
285 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1956); Smith v. United States, 283 F.2d 744
(9th Cir. 1956); Bruce v. United States, 218 F.2d 819 (6th Cir.
1954.)
As the Hite and Ackerson cases pointed out, if this statute is to
be administered with any degree of practicability, it is desirable that
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the word "stolen" should have a uniform meaning throughout the
country and not depend upon the law of the state where the auto-
mobile was taken from the owner. In accord with this proposition
it has been held that, in the absence of a plain indication to the
contrary, the meaning of a federal statute should not depend upon
state law. Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1948); United
States v. Handley, 142 F.2d 351, 354 (2d Cir. 1944). The Supreme
Court recognized, in the instant case, that where a federal statute uses
a common law term of established meaning without otherwise defining
it, the general practice is to give that term its common law meaning.
United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611 (1881); United States v. Smith,
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820); United States v. Brandenburg,
144 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1944). But what is the true common law
definition of this term "stolen"?
Upon consulting the lexicographers we are once again con-
fronted with a difference of opinion. Ballantine states that "steal"
means to commit larceny. BArLANmE, LAw DicroNAIY AND
PRONUNCiTmoNS (1930). On the other hand Bouvier finds the term
"stealing" to import nearly the same as larceny; but in common
parlance it does not always mean a felony. Bouvimx, LAw Dic-
IONARY (BaIwin ed. 1948). Black writes that the term is commonly
used in indictments for larceny and denotes the commission of theft.
BLAcK, LAw DicroNARY (4th ed. 1951). As the Court noted,
Webster, in defining "theft" says that "stealing" and "theft" are
broader terms than "larceny" and include embezzlement. WEBSrx,
NEw INTEiNATIONAL DIGrIONAIRY (2d ed. 1953).
The state courts have also had some difficulty defining this
term. The Oklahoma court when faced with the problem, found
that an examination of the authorities showed that "larceny" and
"stealing" were synonymous terms at common law. Hughes v.
Territory, 8 Okla. 28, 56 Pac. 708 (1899). Other states had held
the word "steal" in a criminal statute ordinarily imports the common
law offense of larceny. State v. Frost, 289 S.W. 895, 897 (Mo.
1926); State v. Uhier, 32 N.D. 483, 156 N.W. 220, 226 (1916);
Gardner v. State, 55 N.J.L. 17, 26 Atl. 30, 33 (1892). On the other
hand Massachusetts found that "steal" may denote the criminal
taking of personal property either by larceny, embezzlement, or
false pretenses. Commonwealth v. Farmer, 218 Mass. 507, 106
N.E. 150 (1914). West Virginia has given the term two meanings.
In its narrow and technical sense the term denotes a felonious
taking synonymous with the term 'larceny." However, in its popular
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and broader meaning, the word "steal" or "stolen" signifies a wrong-
ful or unlawful taking. State v. Blake, 95 W. Va. 467, 121 S.E.
488, 489 (1924). Other jurisdictions have also recognized that in
popular usage "stealing" may include the unlawful appropriation of
things which are not technically the subject of larceny. Buxton v.
International Indemnity Co., 47 Calif. App. 583, 191 Pac. 84, 86
(1920); Barnhart v. State, 154 Ind. 177, 56 N.E. 212 (1900).
In an early federal decision the court found no use of the
word "stear' in defining larceny by any of the common law author-
ities, and held it not a technical word, in the strict sense of that
term, but a common word applied to almost any unlawful taking
without regard to exactness of use or accurate technical terminology.
United States v. Stone, 8 Fed. 232, 247 (W.D. Tenn. 1881). In a
more recent decision it was held that the term "stealing" had no
common law definition to restrict its meaning as an offense and is
commonly used to denote any dishonest transaction whereby one
person obtains that which belongs to another. Crabb v. Zerbst,
99 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1936). The Court, in the instant case, accepts
the view that "stolen" or "stealing" has no common law meaning.
However, it is submitted that, since faced with this wide difference
of opinion of the authorities, the most logical view to adopt is that
set forth by the West Virginia court recognizing two definitions, one
being technical and restricted to larceny and the other nontechnical
including embezzlement and other fraudulent takings. State v.
Blake, supra. Under this nontechnical meaning the same result
would be reached as in the principal case.
The effect of the holding in the instant case is to give a federal
penal statute a liberal interpretation, thus engaging in what has
been termed as judicial legislation. HALL, PR aiNPLES oF CBIvaL
LAw 32 (1947). It is a universally accepted proposition at common
law that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. However, as
pointed out by the Court, this rule does not mean that every criminal
statute must be given the narrowest possible meaning in complete
disregard of the purpose of the legislature. United States v.
Brambett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955); United States v. Sullivan, 332
U.S. 689 (1948). Under this doctrine, if it were reasonably ap-
parent that Congress intended to include offenses other than larceny
within this federal act, the Court was justified in its decision. But,
if this intent of Congress were not readily apparent then, as Mr.
Justice Frankfurter pointed out in the dissent, if Congress desired
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to include these other offenses, it should express itself with less
ambiguity.
From an examination of the Committee Report concerning this
statute, it can be seen that the purpose of the proposed law was
to provide severe punishment for those guilty of stealing auto-
mobiles in interstate or foreign commerce. H.R. 312, 66th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1919). Nothing was said concerning embezzlement or
false pretenses although larceny was specifically mentioned. The
language does not indicate that Congress intended to include any-
thing other than larceny within the act. Therefore, although it
can logically be argued that this statute is directed at automobile
theft whether such theft be by larceny, embezzlement, or other
felonious takings, it is submitted that such a liberal interpretation,
under the circumstances, is a dangerous step away from the lenity
toward the defendant which should guide the construction of
criminal statutes. The better approach to the problem appears to
be that taken by Mr. Justice Holmes in a decision excluding air-
planes from the meaning of the term "motor vehicles," as used in
this same statute. There he stated, "Although it is not likely that a
criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders
or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the
world in language that the common world will understand, of what
the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warn-
ing fair, so far as possible the line should be clear." MeBoylo v.
United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931).
T.E.P.
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